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STATEMENT” 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Michigan v. Bryant1 presents an opportunity for the Supreme 
Court to provide a more comprehensive definition of “testimonial 
statements.” Specifically, the Court will determine whether a dying 
victim’s statements to police officers regarding the circumstances of 
his shooting fall within the realm of testimonial statements and thus, 
are barred by the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment.2 
The Confrontation Clause guarantees an accused defendant the right 
“to be confronted with the witnesses against him.”3 If a witness is 
unavailable for cross-examination at trial and cross-examination 
previously was not possible, out-of-court statements will be admitted 
only in very limited circumstances. The Supreme Court has held that 
statements “made in the course of police interrogation under 
circumstances objectively indicating that the primary purpose of the 
interrogation is to enable police assistance to meet an ongoing 
emergency” are “non-testimonial” and thus, do not violate the 
Confrontation Clause.4 In contrast, statements made after an 
emergency has ended with the primary purpose of assisting police 
prosecution are “testimonial” and inadmissible unless the 
Confrontation Clause guarantees have been met.5 
In Bryant, the victim’s statements were made in response to police 
questioning six blocks away from the scene of the shooting and thirty 
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 1. Michigan v. Bryant, No. 09-150 (U.S. argued Oct. 5, 2010). 
 2. Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 1, Bryant, No. 09-150 (U.S. July 29, 2009). 
 3. U.S. CONST. amend. VI. 
 4. Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813, 813–14 (2006). 
 5. Id. at 822. 
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minutes after the fact. The Court now has the opportunity to address 
open questions regarding the scope of ongoing emergencies and the 
proper perspective for determining whether a statement is 
testimonial. This situation falls in the broad, uncharted gray area 
between the Court’s two recent decisions—Davis v. Washington6 and 
Crawford v. Washington7—regarding the scope of protection that the 
Confrontation Clause affords defendants. In Bryant, the Court will 
likely elucidate the meaning and breadth of “ongoing emergency” and 
“primary purpose,” by more clearly distinguishing between what is 
and what is not a testimonial statement. 
II. FACTS 
On April 28, 2001, around 3:25 AM, five Detroit police officers 
responded to a radio call regarding a man shot at a gas station.8 At the 
gas station the officers found Anthony Covington lying beside his car 
with a gunshot wound to his stomach.9 The officers testified that 
Covington was clearly in pain as evidenced by his “moaning, facial 
expressions, difficulty breathing and difficulty speaking.”10 When 
asked by the officers what happened, Covington replied that “Rick” 
shot him thirty minutes earlier at a house approximately six blocks 
away from the gas station.11 The house was later confirmed to be 
Richard Bryant’s place of residence.12 Covington further stated that 
he had been conversing with a man, whose voice he recognized as 
Rick’s, through the closed back door of Bryant’s house when shots 
were fired through the door.13 He described “Rick” as a black male, 
age forty, 5’7” and approximately 140 pounds.14 Covington was then 
transported to the hospital, where he died a few hours later.15 Upon 
the medical personnel’s arrival at the gas station, the police officers 
and other back-up police officers headed immediately toward the 
 
 6. Id. at 813. 
 7. Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004). 
 8. Brief for Respondent at 1, Michigan v. Bryant, No. 09-150 (U.S. June 16, 2010). 
 9. Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 2, at 6. 
 10. People v. Bryant (Bryant I), No. 02-005508, 2007 WL 675471, at *2 (Mich. Ct. App. 
Mar. 6, 2007). 
 11. Brief for Respondent, supra note 8, at 1. 
 12. Id. at 2. 
 13. Id. at 1. 
 14. Id. at 2 (Subsequent investigation revealed that Richard Bryant was 30 years old, 5’10”, 
and 180 pounds.). 
 15. Id. 
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address provided by Covington.16 Although the officers did not find 
the defendant at his house, they discovered blood, a bullet on the back 
porch, a bullet hole through the back door, and Covington’s wallet 
and identification.17 
Bryant was arrested a year later in California, and his first trial 
resulted in a hung jury.18 At his second trial, however, Bryant was 
convicted of second-degree murder, for being a felon in possession of 
a firearm, and for the possession of a firearm during the commission 
of a felony.19 Bryant appealed his conviction, claiming the trial court 
erred by admitting Covington’s statements identifying Bryant as the 
shooter in violation of his Confrontation Clause rights.20 
The Michigan Court of Appeals upheld Bryant’s conviction on the 
grounds that the statements were non-testimonial because they “were 
made in the course of a police interrogation under circumstances 
objectively indicating that its primary purpose was to enable police 
assistance to meet an ongoing emergency.”21 Recognizing that the 
police officers were faced with a bleeding victim and little additional 
information, the court found that the officers’ interrogation of the 
victim was conducted in furtherance of responding to the ongoing 
emergency.22 Thus, the court concluded that Covington’s statements in 
response to the officers’ questioning were admissible, non-testimonial 
hearsay.23 Bryant once again appealed the ruling.24 
III. LEGAL BACKGROUND 
The Confrontation Clause guarantees an accused defendant the 
right “to be confronted with the witnesses against him . . . .”25 The 
original purpose of the Confrontation Clause, grounded in the belief 
 
 16. Id. at 3. 
 17. Id. at 4–5. 
 18. Id. at 4, 6. 
 19. Id. at 6. 
 20. Id. The trial court’s ruling was handed down before the Supreme Court’s Crawford and 
Davis decisions. Defendant’s motion to suppress the victim’s statements to the police were 
denied by the trial court, which held that the statements were admissible under the excited 
utterance exception to the state hearsay rule. See MICH. R. EVID. 803(2). 
 21. People v. Bryant (Bryant I), No. 02-005508, 2007 WL 675471, at *2 (Mich. Ct. App. 
Mar. 6, 2007). 
 22. Id. at 3. 
 23. Id. 
 24. People v. Bryant (Bryant II), 768 N.W.2d 65, 65 (Mich. 2009), cert. granted sub nom. 
Michigan v. Bryant, 130 S. Ct. 1685 (U.S. Mar. 1, 2010) (No. 09-150). 
 25. U.S. CONST. amend. VI. 
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that it would be difficult to lie while facing the accused, was to ensure 
the veracity of trial testimony.26 It was also intended to prevent 
government manipulation of evidence, like that which occurred 
during the infamous Sir Walter Raleigh treason trial in which an 
adverse ex parte affidavit was admitted without providing Sir Raleigh 
with an opportunity to cross-examine the witness.27 The Framers 
sought to prevent a similar situation in which the defendant was 
unable to confront the witness to test the authenticity of the 
information recorded in an affidavit and to ensure that the 
information as recorded was not manipulated by authorities. 
A recent line of Supreme Court cases have helped guide lower 
courts in determining whether out-of-court statements are admissible 
or barred by the Confrontation Clause. In Crawford v. Washington,28 
the Supreme Court held that “[t]estimonial statements of witnesses 
absent from trial [are admissible] only where the declarant is 
unavailable, and only where the defendant has had a prior 
opportunity to cross-examine.”29 The Court chose to leave “for 
another day any effort to spell out a comprehensive definition of 
‘testimonial’,” but did explain that the term “applies at a minimum to 
prior testimony at a preliminary hearing . . . and to police 
interrogations.”30 The Court also noted that testimonial statements 
could include “statements that were made under circumstances which 
would lead an objective witness reasonably to believe that the 
statement would be available for use at a later trial.”31 In light of these 
principles, Crawford held that statements provided by the defendant’s 
wife during a police interrogation at the police station hours after the 
incident were inadmissible testimonial hearsay statements.32 This 
decision overruled the Court’s prior Confrontation Clause case, Ohio 
v. Roberts,33 in which the Court held that the Confrontation Clause did 
not bar admission of out-of-court statements of witnesses unavailable 
for cross-examination as long as the statements bore “adequate 
indicia of reliability.”34 
 
 26. Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 61 (2004). 
 27. Id. at 44. 
 28. Id. at 36. 
 29. Id. at 59. 
 30. Id. at 68. 
 31. Id. at 51–52 (citations omitted). 
 32. Id. at 36. 
 33. Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56 (1980). 
 34. Id. at 66 (The Roberts test only required the contested evidence to fall within a “firmly 
rooted hearsay exception” or to bear “particularized guarantees of trustworthiness,” thereby 
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Two years later, in Davis v. Washington,35 the Court inched forward 
on the path toward providing clearer definitions of testimonial and 
non-testimonial statements.36 The Court held that statements are 
“testimonial when the circumstances objectively indicate that there is 
no such ongoing emergency, and that the primary purpose of the 
interrogation is to establish or prove past events potentially relevant 
to later criminal prosecution.”37 In contrast, “[s]tatements are non-
testimonial when made in the course of police interrogation under 
circumstances objectively indicating that the primary purpose of the 
interrogation is to enable police assistance to meet an ongoing 
emergency.”38 
In Davis, the disputed statements were made during a 911-call in 
which the victim told the operator, “[The defendant is] here jumpin’ 
on me again . . . . He’s usin’ his fists.”39 The Davis Court found these 
statements to be non-testimonial because the “primary purpose” of 
the interrogation was to seek help during an ongoing emergency.40 In 
reaching this conclusion, the Court noted that: (1) the victim was 
“speaking about events as they were actually happening, rather than 
describing past events . . . hours after the events”; (2) the victim was 
facing an “ongoing emergency”; (3) “the nature of what was asked 
and answered . . . was such that the elicited statements were necessary 
to be able to resolve the present emergency, rather than simply to 
learn (as in Crawford) what had happened in the past”; and (4) the 
victim’s “frantic answers were provided over the phone, in an 
environment that was not tranquil, or even . . . safe.”41 The Court 
clarified that although all of these factors should be considered in 
determining the testimonial nature of the statements, none of them 
are dispositive.42 The Davis Court further explained that it is also 
possible for a declarant’s statement to change from non-testimonial to 
 
allowing many admissions of out-of-court statements.). 
 35. Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813 (2006). 
 36. Richard D. Friedman, “We Really (For the Most Part) Mean It!,” 105 MICH. L. REV. 
FIRST IMPRESSIONS 1, 2 (2006), http://students.law.umich.edu/mlr/firstimpressions/vol105/ 
friedman.pdf. 
 37. Davis, 547 U.S. at 822. 
 38. Id. 
 39. Id. at 817 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 40. Id. at 828. 
 41. Id. at 827 (alteration omitted) (emphasis in original) (citations omitted) (internal 
quotation marks omitted). 
 42. Id. 
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testimonial.43 For example, although the declarant’s identification of 
the perpetrator during a 911-call was non-testimonial because the 
perpetrator was in the same room and still posed a danger, when the 
perpetrator fled the premises and no longer presented a danger, all 
subsequent statements became testimonial.44 
In Hammon v. Indiana,45 the companion case decided alongside 
Davis, the police responded to a reported domestic disturbance to 
find the victim sitting on the porch alone while the defendant was 
inside.46 While outside and separated from the defendant, the victim 
told the police about the defendant hitting her.47 The Court held that 
the victim’s statements were testimonial as “the primary, if not indeed 
the sole, purpose of the interrogation was to investigate a possible 
crime.”48 The Court distinguished Hammon from Davis by noting that 
here, “the interrogation was part of an investigation in possibly 
criminal past conduct” and, as the questions were meant to determine 
what happened rather than “what is happening,” no ongoing 
emergency was in progress.49 The Davis declarant sought aid while in 
immediate danger, whereas the Hammon declarant recounted past 
events while in the protection of the police.50 
The Davis decision attempted to draw a bright line between “what 
happened” and “what is happening.”51 That line is not so easily drawn, 
however, because answering the question of “what is happening” 
often requires recounting the details of “what happened”—especially 
in factual situations similar to the one at hand.52 Another concern 
raised by the Davis decision is the possibility of the police 
manipulating how they phrase questions when responding to 
emergency calls in order to meet the Court’s ongoing emergency 
requirement for non-testimonial statements.53 Although the Davis 
Court’s “primary purpose” analysis focused on assessing the 
 
 43. Id. at 828–29. 
 44. Id. 
 45. Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813 (2006). 
 46. Id. at 819. 
 47. Id. at 820. 
 48. Id. 
 49. Id. at 829–30. 
 50. Id. at 831. 
 51. Lisa Kern Griffin, Circling Around the Confrontation Clause: Redefined Reach But Not 
a Robust Right, 105 MICH. L. REV. FIRST IMPRESSIONS 16, 17–18 (2006), http://students.law. 
umich.edu/mlr/firstimpressions/vol105/griffin.pdf. 
 52. Id. 
 53. Id. at 19. 
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interrogator’s purpose throughout the opinion, it then complicated 
matters within a single footnote. The Court stated that “in the final 
analysis [it is] the declarant’s statements, not the interrogation’s 
questions, that the Confrontation Clause requires us to evaluate.”54 
Confrontation Clause cases currently sit on a spectrum with 
Crawford and Hammon representing the testimonial-end and Davis 
representing the non-testimonial end. At the Crawford/Hammon end, 
statements are likely to be found testimonial when physical and 
temporal separation between the interrogation and the crime is 
present.55 For example, a strong indication of testimonial statements 
exists if the interrogation took place in the secluded and safe 
environment of the police station and the declarant provided answers 
in a clear and calm manner, similar to a witness testifying at trial.56 At 
the Davis end of the spectrum, factors signifying that statements are 
non-testimonial include the presence of both the victim and the 
perpetrator at the crime scene as a frantic narrative is given, 
suggesting the criminal event is ongoing, and the lack of physical and 
temporal separation between the crime and the statements being 
uttered.57 Although the Supreme Court has provided clear guidance 
regarding the admissibility of statements falling at either end of this 
spectrum, most statements fall somewhere in the middle, resulting in 
unpredictable outcomes regarding evidence admissibility in the lower 
courts. 
Michigan v. Bryant poses an important opportunity for the Court 
to clarify the boundaries of the Confrontation Clause and the scope 
of protection it affords defendants on the spectrum between the 
Davis and Crawford/Hammon decisions. Until now, the Court has 
avoided providing a dispositive list of criteria for determining the 
nature of out-of-court statements,58 but Bryant may be the case where 
the Court finally replaces the Confrontation Clause “spectrum” with a 
clearer delineation between testimonial and non-testimonial 
statements. 
 
 54. Davis, 547 U.S. at 822 n.1 (2006). 
 55. Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 64 (2004); Davis, 547 U.S. at 831. 
 56. Id. 
 57. Davis, 547 U.S. at 827. 
 58. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 68; Davis, 547 U.S. at 831. 
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IV. HOLDING 
In a 4–3 decision, the Michigan Supreme Court reversed and 
remanded the Court of Appeals’s judgment by finding Covington’s 
statements testimonial pursuant to Crawford and Davis and therefore 
inadmissible under the Confrontation Clause.59 The court observed 
that the statements related “solely to events that had occurred in the 
past and at a different location . . . . [N]one alleged any ongoing threat, 
and none asserted the possible presence of the alleged perpetrator.”60 
According to the court, the primary purpose of the questioning was 
not to enable police assistance to meet an “ongoing emergency,” but 
rather to obtain the facts of a past event, as evidenced by the police 
asking about “what happened” rather than “what is happening.”61 In 
considering the Davis requirement that the final evaluation focus on 
the declarant, the Michigan Supreme Court determined that it was 
Convington’s primary purpose, surrounded by police officers and safe 
from imminent danger, to identify the defendant in order to ensure 
police apprehension and subsequent prosecution.62 The court found 
Covington’s situation similar to Davis where “once the defendant 
stopped attacking the victim and drove away from the premises, the 
emergency appear[ed] to have ended.”63 Here, when Covington drove 
to the gas station, away from the shooter, the ongoing emergency 
effectively ended.64 
The majority rejected the dissent’s argument that an ongoing 
emergency still existed because the criminal was still at large and the 
victim was severely wounded. That proposition, the court reasoned, 
would deem almost all statements made during ongoing police 
investigations before the accused is apprehended non-testimonial.65 
The Michigan Supreme Court closely analogized the present case 
with Hammon in that both declarants were separated from the 
defendants, in the presence of police, and a period of time had passed 
 
 59. People v. Bryant (Bryant II), 768 N.W.2d 65, 79 (Mich. 2009), cert. granted sub nom. 
Michigan v. Bryant, 130 S. Ct. 1685 (U.S. Mar. 1, 2009) (No. 09-150). 
 60. Id. at 71. 
 61. Id. at 75. The court noted that the behavior of the police officers at the gas station was 
consistent with that of police officers investigating a past crime rather than that of officers 
meeting a ongoing threat. None of the officers drew their weapons or searched for the shooter 
at the station. 
 62. Id. at 73, 71. 
 63. Id. at 74. 
 64. Id. at 73. 
 65. Id. 
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since the crime had been committed. Although Crawford suggests 
that a dying declaration by its nature is admissible and an exception 
to the testimonial hearsay rule,66 the court declined to consider this 
issue.67 In finding the statements testimonial and therefore 
inadmissible, the court ruled the admission of Covington’s statements 
to be a plain error entitling Bryant to a new trial.68 
The dissent argued that an ongoing emergency existed and that 
the circumstances indicated that the primary purpose of the 
interrogation was to enable police assistance in response to the 
emergency.69 The majority, in the dissent’s view, assessed the facts in 
hindsight “rather than with an objective view of the circumstances at 
the time the statements were made[,]” as Davis required.70 The dissent 
stated that Davis never set “an artificial threshold” for the amount of 
time allowed between the initial criminal event and the utterance of 
the statement before the emergency is automatically considered 
over.71 The dissent distinguished Hammon from Bryant in two ways: 
(1) the whereabouts of Covington’s shooter were unknown while the 
Hammon assailant was known to be inside the house; and (2) 
Hammon’s imminent danger threat was “negligible” relative to 
Covington’s uncertain circumstances at the gas station.72 The dissent 
found Bryant closer to Davis than Hammon and thus concluded that 
Covington’s statements were non-testimonial.73 
V. ARGUMENTS 
A. Michigan’s (Petitioner's) Argument 
Petitioner Michigan does not challenge the Davis standard itself, 
but argues that the Michigan Supreme Court applied the standard 
incorrectly in finding that the preliminary inquiries and the answers 
 
 66. Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 57 (2004). 
 67. Id. at 76–78. The prosecutor failed to seek admission of the statements as dying 
declarations with the Appeals Court and the Michigan Supreme Court, while the defense 
consistently asserted that the statements were not dying declarations and should not be 
admitted as such. “Accordingly, the prosecutor has either effectively conceded that the victim’s 
statements did not constitute a dying declaration or, at the very least, has abandoned this issue.” 
Id. at 78. 
 68. Id. at 79. 
 69. Id. (Corrigan, J., dissenting). 
 70. Id. at 79–80. 
 71. Id. at 80–81. 
 72. Id. at 81. 
 73. Id. at 82. 
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given to “enable the police to identify, locate, and apprehend the 
perpetrator”74 at the gas station were outside the scope of ongoing 
emergency.75 Michigan urges the Supreme Court to adopt the 
Michigan Court of Appeals’s conception of “ongoing emergency,” 
“encompass[ing] (1) a crime still in progress, and (2) situations in 
which the declarant or officer is in danger, either because of a medical 
emergency or because the perpetrator poses a threat.”76 
Michigan asserts that an ongoing emergency existed because a 
shooter was still at large, posing an unknown threat to public safety, 
the victim, and police officers. Additionally, Covington’s bleeding 
wound constituted a medical emergency and the answers he provided 
between gasping breaths was not the type of formal testimony that 
the Confrontation Clause intended to bar from trial.77 Michigan 
argues that in order to evaluate the level of danger surrounding the 
circumstances, the police officers needed to ask Covington if the 
shooter was in the area, if he had shot anyone else, and if he was likely 
to continue shooting.78 The questions were meant to assist police in 
apprehending the dangerous shooter and phrasing the questions and 
responses in the past tense does not negate the immediacy of the 
potentially dangerous situation encountered by police at the gas 
station.79 Further, Michigan claims that because “[t]he Court chose the 
term ‘ongoing emergency,’ not ‘ongoing criminal event,’ and nothing 
in the language limits the word ‘emergency’ to criminal conduct,” the 
Court should not construe the scope of ongoing emergency as 
narrowly as Bryant proposes.80 
To determine the “primary purpose” of the statements, Michigan 
argues that the evaluation must focus on the circumstances under 
which the interrogation happened, rather than the actual substance of 
the statements.81 Michigan’s “primary purpose” position was 
supported by the United States in its amicus brief in which former 
 
 74. Id. at 71. 
 75. Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 2, at 9. Michigan further noted the 
inconsistent decisions among the lower courts about whether such preliminary questioning 
regarding “what happened” constitutes an “interrogation” separate from the issue of an ongoing 
emergency. 
 76. Petitioner’s Brief on the Merits at 12, Michigan v. Bryant, No. 09-150 (U.S. Apr. 29, 
2010). 
 77. Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 2, at 9. 
 78. Id. at 15. 
 79. Id. 
 80. Petitioner’s Reply Brief at 1, Bryant, No. 09-150 (U.S. July 15, 2010). 
 81. Petitioner’s Brief on the Merits, supra note 76, at 17. 
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Solicitor General Kagan urged that “statements given in response to 
questioning that, objectively considered, is aimed primarily at 
enabling police to meet an ongoing emergency are not properly 
considered testimonial. Such questioning bears little resemblance to 
the historical abuses that animated the Confrontation Clause.”82 
Michigan contends that if Covington had called 911 to report the 
shooting the statements clearly would have been non-testimonial like 
in Davis.83 The mere fact that Covington’s statements were made in 
person should not now make the statements testimonial and therefore 
inadmissible.84 
Recently, the Supreme Court’s decisions have tended to 
strengthen defendants’ Confrontation Clause protections in specific 
situations when applying it to statements made by lab analysts85 and 
when defining the boundaries of the forfeiture doctrine narrowly.86 In 
Davis, however, the Court has also appeared to narrow the scope of 
the Confrontation Clause by introducing the “primary purpose” test.87 
If the Court upholds the Michigan Supreme Court’s ruling, it will 
necessarily expand the Confrontation Clause. The bar for the 
admission of out-of-court statements will be even higher because it 
would suggest that most statements to the law enforcement and 
emergency responders at the crime scene, even those statements 
made during a standard 911-call about a recent and nearby shooting 
in the midst of a medical emergency, would be considered testimonial. 
Expanding the Confrontation Clause in this way will make the job of 
prosecutors much more difficult.88 
B. Bryant’s (Respondent’s) Argument 
Respondent Bryant contends that the phrase “ongoing 
emergency” should be limited to the actual crime itself.89 Covington’s 
 
 82. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner at 8, Bryant, No. 
09-150 (U.S. May 6, 2010). 
 83. Petitioner’s Brief on the Merits, supra note 76, at 16. 
 84. Id. 
 85. See, e.g., Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 129 S. Ct. 2527 (2009). 
 86. See, e.g., Giles v. California, 128 S. Ct. 2678 (2008). 
 87. Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813, 822 n.1 (2006). The Davis Court overturned 
Crawford’s implication that almost all statements made during police questioning would be 
regarded as testimonial. 
 88. Andrew C. Fine, Refining Crawford: The Confrontation Clause after Davis v. 
Washington and Hammon v. Indiana, 105 MICH. L. REV. FIRST IMPRESSIONS 11, 11 (2006), 
http://students.law.umich.edu/mlr/firstimpressions/vol105/fine.pdf. 
 89. Brief for Respondent, supra note 8, at 25. 
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statements were provided thirty minutes after the shooting and six 
blocks away from the crime scene—the emergency had ended when 
Covington drove away from the crime scene and was over by the time 
that the police arrived at the gas station.90 Bryant asserts that the 
police officers’ actions upon arriving at the gas station support the 
premise that no fear of imminent danger existed.91 
Bryant challenges Michigan’s interpretation of “ongoing 
emergency” as too broad because it would require all witness 
statements taken while the perpetrator remained at large to be 
considered non-testimonial and admissible in court, thereby 
eviscerating the Confrontation Clause’s protections for the accused.92 
He further argues that Davis intended the “primary purpose” 
examination to turn on the substance of and the purpose behind the 
witness’s statement, rather than the motivations of the interrogator’s 
questions and the circumstances in which the declarant was 
questioned.93 Bryant contends that Covington’s statement was just a 
narration of past events because there was no imminent threat that 
Covington sought to escape.94 Therefore, in keeping with Davis, 
Bryant argues that the Michigan Supreme Court’s decision regarding 
the admissibility of Covington’s statements must be upheld.95 
As amicus for Bryant, the National Association of Criminal 
Defense Lawyers urged the adoption of a declarant’s perspective  
such that “a statement’s testimonial status depends on its evidentiary 
purpose—i.e., on whether the statement, objectively viewed, was 
made to provide evidence in a criminal investigation or prosecution.” 
96 Professor Richard Friedman advanced a similar stance in favor of 
the “reasonable declarant” standard in his amicus brief: “[a] statement 
should be deemed testimonial if a reasonable person in the speaker’s 
position would understand that it would likely be used for 
prosecutorial purposes.”97 
 
 90. Id. at 26, 24. 
 91. Id. at 10 (The police testified that they did not attempt to secure the station, question 
the attendant, or draw their weapons, though they did call for back-up when they arrived at 
Bryant’s residence.). 
 92. Id. at 22. 
 93. Id. at 35. 
 94. Id. at 31. 
 95. Id. at 38. 
 96. Brief of the National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers as Amicus Curiae in 
Support of Respondent at 3, Bryant, No. 09-150 (U.S. June 23, 2010). 
 97. Brief of Richard D. Friedman as Amicus Curiae in Support of Respondent at 5, 
Michigan v. Bryant, No. 09-150 (U.S. June 23, 2010). 
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It appears that these amici are concerned that a ruling for 
Michigan would affirm that lower courts are to examine the 
interrogator’s primary purpose.98 With the focus away from the 
declarant, the amici believe that this narrower interpretation of the 
Confrontation Clause will not provide the necessary protection to 
defendants and their right to cross-examination.99 Further, the amici 
contend that adopting the rule proposed by Michigan would lead to 
an increased admission of statements in almost all situations involving 
violent perpetrators still at large because their “at-large” status would 
automatically make the situations “ongoing emergencies.”100 
Accordingly, all the statements made to crime scene responders, like 
police, would be admitted as non-testimonial and outside scope of the 
Confrontation Clause.101 Additionally, there is concern that with a 
narrowed conception of Confrontation Clause, an increase in the 
admission of unreliable statements at trial will increase the likelihood 
of false convictions.102 For example, a declarant in Covington’s 
situation could implicate someone out of sheer maliciousness, and 
these malicious statements would be admitted at trial without an 
opportunity for cross-examination.103 
C. Oral Arguments 
At oral arguments, the Court appeared dissatisfied with the results 
that Davis’s standard had produced.104 Counsel Lori Palmer, on behalf 
of Petitioner Michigan, attempted to argue that Covington’s 
statements in response to police questioning lacked the formality 
suggested in prior cases, but Justice Scalia quickly rejected this 
contention, saying, “[f]orget about formality . . . . Formality or no 
formality has nothing to do with it.”105 Justice Scalia, author of both 
Crawford and Davis, noted that a rule premised on context would 
result in the admission of almost all statements, given that all 
questions at a crime scene could be construed as assessing the risk of 
 
 98. Id. at 6–8. 
 99. See id. at 9. (‘Therefore, the officer could nearly always testify, ‘My primary purpose 
was not to gather evidence for use in interrogation, because I did not even know a crime had 
been committed . . .’.”). 
 100. Id. at 10. 
 101. Id. at 9–10. 
 102. Id. at 12–13. 
 103. Id. 
 104. Transcript of Oral Argument at 11–12, Bryant, No. 09-150 (U.S. Oct. 5, 2010). 
 105. Id. at 4. 
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danger inherent in police work.106 With regard to the specific facts in 
Bryant, Justice Scalia seemed skeptical that the police officers onsite 
were actively assessing the risk when he said, “The behavior of the 
police here gave no indication that they thought they were in danger 
immediately and were interrogating this person in order to assess the 
danger to them.”107 Further, Justices Ginsburg and Sotomayor 
questioned how one would go about deciphering an officer’s primary 
purpose when interrogators often have dual motives of assessing risk 
and collecting evidence.108 As Justice Ginsburg noted, “[T]hey would 
ask the [very same] questions if what they wanted was testimonial 
evidence. So you can . . . characterize that set of questions either way. 
What would lead us to pick one rather than the other?”109 
The justices seemed equally dissatisfied with Michigan’s proposal 
that testimonial statements are those solicited with the intent to 
collect evidence for future prosecution.110 Justice Scalia expressed 
doubt regarding how meaningful distinctions could be made between 
questions intended to collect evidence for future prosecution from 
those intended to apprehend the perpetrator.111 He was unimpressed 
with the suggestion that the distinction could be based upon whether 
apprehending the perpetrator would “neutralize an ongoing threat” to 
public safety, given that for all violent crimes, when the violent 
perpetrators are still loose in the community, they will perpetually 
pose a possible threat to public safety.112 
The justices expressed strong disapproval when Counsel Peter Jon 
Van Hoek, on behalf of Respondent Bryant, argued that the focus 
should be on the content of the declarant’s statement, and that 
“ongoing emergency” should be based upon a formal boundary of 
whether the event was an ongoing or a past event and whether there 
is any indication of “immediacy.”113 Chief Justice Roberts skeptically 
asked, “[W]hat would you do with the statement ‘The guy in the gas 
station shot me’? Is that purely past or is that an ongoing 
 
 106. Id. at 18. For example, Justice Scalia asked, “[a]nd you’re saying, whenever policemen 
come upon a victim of violent crime and said who did it, what’s his name, all of that will always 
be admissible because they—they could be assessing the risk, right?” 
 107. Id. at 14. 
 108. Id. at 5–7. 
 109. Id. at 25–26. 
 110. Id. at 21. 
 111. Id. 
 112. Id. at 22. 
 113. Id. at 36, 59. 
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emergency?”114 Justice Alito also questioned, “[C]an there be an 
ongoing emergency where the statement . . . recounts something that 
has occurred, not something that is occurring?”115 Bryant’s counsel 
responded that it was possible and eventually conceded that context 
needed to be considered to determine whether a declaration about 
past events was properly testimonial.116 
Justices Kennedy and Alito seemingly favored a broader scope for 
“ongoing emergency.”117 Justice Kennedy stated that even though dual 
motives for collecting evidence might always be present, the fact that 
“you do not know if the man is running amok and threatening to 
shoot other people” is enough to possibly justify “ongoing 
emergency” in this case.118 Justice Ginsburg suggested that the case 
could be solved by the dying declaration exception when she asked 
Michigan’s counsel, “[I]f you had the benefit of hindsight, and this 
trial occurred before Davis . . . would you have instead tried to make a 
case that this was a dying declaration?”119 Justice Scalia disagreed with 
Justice Ginsburg by noting that, with the exception of forfeiture, “I 
don’t know of any cases that allow a dying declaration in over a 
Confrontation Clause objection.”120 Justice Kennedy questioned 
whether Davis was essentially testing reliability as under the 
overturned Roberts framework, all over again.121 
VI. ANALYSIS 
As evidenced by these arguments and the justices’ responses, 
there are competing viewpoints regarding the “primary purpose” of 
the interrogation because the Court has left open the issue of whose 
purpose is being examined. Those who believe that the Confrontation 
Clause’s central purpose is to ensure reliable statements at trial are 
more likely to argue that the Court is referring to the declarant’s 
purpose.122 Those who believe the Confrontation Clause’s primary 
 
 114. Id. at 46. 
 115. Id. at 45. 
 116. Id. at 44. 
 117. Id. at 13. 
 118. Id. 
 119. Id. at 20. 
 120. Id. at 43. 
 121. Id. at 27, 28. (“What would be the rationale for admitting this statement, then? Is it 
more reliable? Because if we say that, then we’re undercutting Crawford, which says reliability 
is not the key . . . because the police likely have less motive to manipulate the statements and to 
ask loaded questions? That in itself, it seems to me, is a reliable . . . .”). 
 122. Griffin, supra note 51, at 20. 
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purpose is to protect defendants from government manipulation of 
evidence are more likely to argue that it is the interrogator’s purpose 
that should be the focus.123 It seems too simplistic to consider primary 
purpose purely from either the declarant’s perspective or the 
interrogator’s perspective.124 While law enforcement often have dual 
motives—to collect evidence and to respond to an ongoing 
emergency—it is equally likely for a declarant to have dual motives of 
making an accusatory statement for prosecution and to provide facts 
in order to receive the appropriate and necessary help during an 
ongoing emergency.125 In fact, while the dual motives of law 
enforcement could be characterized as fairly straightforward and 
predictable, it is likely more problematic for a court to assess the 
declarant’s personal motivations and intentions. With the presence of 
law enforcement, the declarant’s purpose will be influenced in terms 
of how he thinks his answers will be used and perhaps his answers will 
change in tone, whether accusatory or frantic, in response to how the 
police officer is phrasing his questions.126 The police officer and the 
declarant will always have an influence on each other and each 
other’s perception of what is occurring. It is possible that the Court’s 
vague pronouncements in recent Confrontation Clause decisions have 
been attempts to consider the perspectives of both the declarant and 
law enforcement, and perhaps this is why the Court has avoided 
confirming exactly whose perspective is being examined.127 As police 
interrogations and the nature of criminal events are rarely 
straightforward and often have multiple motives at play, the 
ambiguity regarding whose perspective is being considered affords 
the Court flexibility in reaching its decisions. While this flexibility has 
been convenient for the Supreme Court in developing its  
Confrontation Clause jurisprudence, it has led to split decisions in 
 
 123. Id. at 19. 
 124. Tom Lininger, Davis and Hammon: A Step Forward, or a Step Back?, 
105 MICH. L. REV. FIRST IMPRESSIONS 28, 29 (2006), http://students.law.umich.edu/mlr/ 
firstimpressions/vol105/lininger.pdf. 
 125. Id. 
 126. See Friedman, supra note 36, at 3 (“Could it be that the interrogator’s purpose is 
significant because of the light it sheds on the declarant’s understanding of the situation?”). 
 127. See Robert P. Mosteller, Davis v. Washington and Hammon v. Indiana: Beating 
Expectations, 105 MICH. L. REV. FIRST IMPRESSIONS 6, 10 (2006), http://students.law.umich.edu/ 
mlr/firstimpressions/vol105/mosteller.pdf. (“Davis, however, did not resolve the issue of whose 
intent counts . . . . Although being interested in both the intent of the questioner and the speaker is 
unusual, it is quite appropriate for the Confrontation Clause.”).  
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lower courts.128 
Speculation persists regarding why the Court chose to emphasize 
the “ongoing emergency” standard as one of the markers of non-
testimonial statements and why the Court chose to reserve a special 
place for statements made during an emergency situation.129 It is 
unclear whether the justices made this distinction because they 
believe that the declarant’s reliability will be at its utmost while he is 
seeking help, or if they believe that law enforcement agents are less 
likely to manipulate evidence for future prosecution when they are 
responding to an emergency. There is certain irony that in a relatively 
short time period, the Court has blazed from Roberts to Crawford to 
Davis a Confrontation Clause path that seemingly has come full circle 
and re-focused on the reliability of the statements130—the core of the 
overturned Roberts standard. Depending on the course that the Court 
chooses to follow on Davis–Crawford spectrums, its decision will have 
a major impact on the application and effect of the Confrontation 
Clause to crime scene statements. 
VII. LIKELY DISPOSITION 
The Supreme Court will likely reverse the Michigan Supreme 
Court’s decision. Recently, the Supreme Court has engaged in a 
reinvigorated inspection of the Confrontation Clause premised on 
cases with specific factual scenarios that allow them to be placed as 
defining marks on the Confrontation Clause spectrum. As Bryant 
indicates, the difficulty in drawing a line between testimonial and non-
testimonial statements is indicative of the tension between protecting 
the defendant’s constitutional right to confront his accuser and the 
search for truth that might require admission of potentially damaging 
statements at trial.131 This is not to suggest that the Confrontation 
 
 128. See Lininger, supra note 124, at 28 (“[L]ower court judges hoped that the Supreme 
Court’s ruling in the consolidated cases of Davis v. Washington and Hammon v. Indiana . . . 
would provide a primer on testimonial hearsay . . . . In fact, the Davis ruling raised nearly as 
many questions as it answered.”). 
 129. See id. at 31. (“One category of unresolved questions relates to the definition of 
‘testimonial’ hearsay. Just how can police—or judges, for that matter—determine precisely 
when an emergency has ended?”). 
 130. Griffin, supra note 51, at 18. 
 131. Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 66 (1980) (“The focus of the Court’s concern has been to 
insure that there ‘are indicia of reliability which have been widely viewed as determinative of 
whether a statement may be placed before the jury though there is no confrontation of the 
declarant.”). Though the Roberts decision may have been overturned, that Court’s primary 
concern is still relevant today.  
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Clause’s constitutional guarantee of cross-examination is always at 
odds with the search for the truth, which would be a clear 
oversimplification, but merely to highlight the delicate balance that 
must be achieved in distinguishing between testimonial and non-
testimonial statements. 
As the Bryant oral arguments confirmed, Confrontation Clause 
cases have produced interesting alignments among the Justices. The 
Supreme Court will likely hold that Covington’s statements were non-
testimonial because they were meant to enable the police’s primary 
purpose of responding appropriately to an “ongoing emergency.” In 
keeping with their positions in past decisions, the unlikely 
Confrontation Clause duo of Justices Ginsburg and Scalia will likely 
depart from the majority and vote to affirm the Michigan Supreme 
Court’s holding that the statements were testimonial. Justices 
Ginsburg and Scalia will likely find that the emergency had ended, 
and, because they tend to emphasize an analysis that centers on the 
motives of the declarant, they will likely note that Covington 
provided statements at that time to implicate the defendant, not to 
seek help.132 
Justice Thomas, the sole dissenter in Hammon, likely will find 
Covington’s final remarks to not possess the “necessary[y] degree of 
solemnity” to meet his conception of a testimonial statement.133 
Justices Kennedy and Alito, and Chief Justice Roberts dissented in 
favor of admitting lab evidence in Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts,134 
another Confrontation Clause case involving the admissibility of lab 
reports when the prosecution did not provide the opportunity for the 
defendant to cross-examine the lab analysts.135 There, these three 
justices stated that they would limit the Confrontation Clause to 
“witnesses like those in Sir Walter Raleigh’s trial . . . conventional 
witness[es] responding to questions under interrogation” and even 
though they acknowledged that the Crawford and Davis victims were 
relatively traditional as witnesses, Covington, a dying victim on the  
 
 
 132. Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 129 S. Ct. 2527, 2529 (2009); Davis v. Washington, 
547 U.S. 813, 814–16 (2006); Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 36–37 (2004). 
 133. Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813, 836 (2006) (Thomas, J., concurring in part and 
dissenting in part). 
 134. Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 129 S. Ct. 2527 (2009). 
 135. See generally id. (holding that drug test reports are testimonial within the meaning of 
the Confrontation Clause). 
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ground, would likely not be considered by these same justices to be a 
“conventional witness.”136 
Although he previously aligned himself with Justices Ginsburg 
and Scalia in Crawford and Davis, Justice Breyer’s show of remorse 
during oral arguments for supporting Crawford’s broadening of the 
Confrontation Clause suggests that he may join Justices Kennedy, 
Thomas, Alito, and Chief Justice Roberts, in concluding that 
Covington’s statements were non-testimonial and properly admitted 
at trial.137 This speculation is supported in part by his dissent in 
Melendez-Diaz, which was Justice Breyer’s first step toward limiting 
just how the Confrontation Clause had expanded following 
Crawford.138 The Melendez-Diaz dissent, in contrast to the majority’s 
emphasis on cross-examination, seemed to place much importance on 
the accepted reliability of scientific evidence in reports and as it was 
the best evidence, it should be admissible without the requirement 
that the analyst, an unconventional witness, testify.139 In Bryant, 
Justices Kennedy, Thomas, Alito, and Chief Justice Roberts will 
probably regard Covington’s last words as reliable and contrary to the 
conventional-accusatory-witness mold that the Confrontation Clause 
was originally concerned about, and that his death should not 
preclude their admission. They seem to be most concerned about the 
potential of law enforcement to manipulate the statement. Thus 
ultimately it may be that these four justices do not want the 
Confrontation Clause to serve as a bar to the best evidence where a 
witness’s unavailability was not due to police manipulation and the 
statements were provided during an emergency. 
Despite Justice Sotomayor’s five years as a former prosecutor,140 
her vote remains somewhat of a mystery, as she has not favored the 
prosecution in her other criminal procedure cases since joining the 
Supreme Court.141 And the Court’s most recent appointee, Justice  
 
Kagan, recused herself from this case because she authored the 
 
 136. Id. at 2551 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). 
 137. Transcript of Oral Argument at 135–36, Bryant, No. 09-150 (U.S. Oct. 5, 2010). (“What 
is the constitutional rationale? I agreed on joining Crawford, but I have to admit to you I’ve had 
many second thoughts when I’ve seen how far it has extended as I have written it.”). 
 138. Melendez-Diaz, 129 S. Ct. at 2551. 
 139. Id. at 2543. 
 140. Office of the Press Secretary, Judge Sonia Sotomayor, THE WHITE HOUSE (May 26, 
2009), http://www.whitehouse.gov/the_press_office/Background-on-Judge-Sonia-Sotomayor/. 
 141. Briscoe v. Virginia, 130 S. Ct. 1316, 1316 (2010). 
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United States’ amicus brief in support of Michigan. 
Bryant will likely be a 5–3 or a 6–2 decision reversing the 
Michigan Supreme Court. The Court will use this opportunity to 
clarify the meaning behind “ongoing emergency” and “primary 
purpose” within the Confrontation Clause jurisprudence. The 
meaning of what is a testimonial statement has caused great confusion 
among the lower courts in fact patterns similar to Bryant. This 
confusion brings into question Davis’s workability in defining the 
boundaries of what is an “ongoing emergency” and from whose 
perspective the Court should look to when evaluating whether a 
statement is testimonial. But, rather than attempting to distinguish 
between what is and is not an emergency, the Court may opt to use 
Bryant to develop an entirely new definition of what is testimonial 
with respect to the Confrontation Clause. 
 
